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ABSTRACT
While it is intuitively plausible that using contacts in job search benefits a job-seeker, there is
still both theoretical disagreement and inconclusive empirical evidence on why a job-seeker's
social capital is associated with her labor-market outcomes (for reviews, see Mouw 2003, 2006).
We take an important step toward identifying the source of this association by proposing a direct
test for whether or not a job-seeker benefits from using her social networks. This direct test holds
an important advantage over an indirect test proposed by Mouw (2003). By using a within-
individual fixed-effects methodology, the direct test rules out most sources of between-individual
heterogeneity (Yakubovich 2005). Therefore, its results are not influenced by the quality of the
measures used to assess a job-seeker's social capital. Using unique data on university graduates'
successful and unsuccessful job-searches, we show that, for job-seekers who use contacts to
search for jobs, that method leads to better labor-market outcomes than formal methods do. We
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the literature on job search and social
networks.
Thesis Supervisor: Elena Obukhova
Title: Assistant Professor of Global Economics and Management
Do Job-Seekers Benefit from Contacts?
A Direct Test
INTRODUCTION
"It is not what you know, but who you know." This is not only a nugget of popular
wisdom and practical experience, but a concise summary of much of the sociological
theorizing on labor markets (for reviews, see Granovetter 1995; Lin 2000; Marsden and
Gorman 2001). It is intuitively plausible that a job-seeker can improve her labor-market
outcomes by using her contacts. On the one hand, contacts can influence the hiring decisions
made by employers or other hiring intermediaries (Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980;
Bian 1997; Bian and Ang 1997). Alternatively, contacts can provide a job-seeker with
information and insight on (a) new job opportunities, (b) job opportunities that provide a
better match for her skills, or (c) firm-specific hiring process (Rees 1966; Granovetter 1973;
Fernandez and Weinberg 1997). Consistent with this intuition, several studies have found
that job-seekers with more social capital achieve better labor-market outcomes (de Graaf and
Flap 1988; Lai, Lin, and Leung 1998; V61ker and Flap 2001; Lin 2002).
Yet, despite the literature's long history, there is still both theoretical disagreement
and inconclusive empirical evidence on why a job-seeker's social capital is associated with
her labor-market outcomes. In particular, recent research suggests the association might be
spurious-an omitted variable may influence both the quality of a job-seeker's social capital
and her labor-market outcomes (Mouw 2003; for a more general statement of this problem,
see Manski 1993). One candidate for this omitted variable is homophily in friendship
networks-the propensity to make friends similar to oneself (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and
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Cook 2001; Mouw 2003, 2006). For example, highly talented people are more likely to be
friends with other highly talented people. They are also more likely to achieve better labor-
market outcomes, independent of their friends' help.
To examine whether the association between social capital and labor-market
outcomes is spurious, Mouw (2003) proposes an indirect test for determining network
causality. Specifically, job-seekers who expect higher returns from using a particular job-
search method should be more likely to use that method than job-seekers who expect lower
returns (Holzer 1987). Thus, we expect that if people benefit from using contacts, job-seekers
with more social capital should be more likely to use contacts than otherwise identical job-
seekers with less social capital. But drawing on data from the Multi-City Study of Urban
Inequality and the Urban Poverty and Family Life Study, Mouw finds that job-seekers who
have more social capital are no more likely to find jobs' through their social networks than
those with less social capital. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that the association
between a job-seeker's social capital and her labor-market outcomes is spurious.
Yet these results are particularly puzzling when we consider the strong evidence in
favor of a non-spurious explanation from single-firm studies (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997;
Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000; Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Fernandez and
Sosa 2005; Yakubovich and Lup 2006). Those studies, which compare the outcomes of job-
seekers applying through referrals to those of job-seekers applying without referrals,
consistently find that the former group achieves better labor-market outcomes. Single-firm
studies have been replicated in a variety of organizations, increasing our confidence in the
When Mouw uses the phrase "use contacts", he actually refers to "finds a job through contacts" (2003:873,
footnote 3). In his case this switch is justified because he shows that if job-seekers are more likely to search
using contacts, they will be more likely to find a job through contacts. However, as we argue in the theory
section, it is important to maintain this conceptual distinction. To avoid confusion, "use networks" refers to a
job-seeker searching forjobs through her network contacts and "finding a job through contacts" refers to a job-
seeker accepting an offer received whiles searching through contacts.
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generalizability of their results. Thus, these two streams of literature yield seemingly
contradictory conclusions about causal relationship between the contacts used to search for
jobs and the labor-market outcomes-an important gap in our understanding of the role of
social networks in labor markets.
In this paper, we take an important step toward filling this gap by proposing a direct
test of whether or not a job-seeker benefits from using her social networks. We argue that to
evaluate the relative effectiveness of different search methods, we need to compare both
successful and unsuccessful search attemptsfor each job-seeker (e.g., Mouw 2002;
Yakubovich 2005; Obukhova 2011). This direct test holds an important advantage over an
indirect test. By using a within-individual methodology, our direct test eliminates the
possibility that unobserved differences between individuals will affect our results. This
means that the direct test's results are not influenced by the quality of the measures used to
assess a job-seeker's social capital.
In the following sections, we discuss the contradiction in the results of previous
studies on whether job-seekers benefit from contacts. We then explain how our empirical
strategy and our research setting-school-to-work transition-provide a unique opportunity
to begin to resolve this contradiction by overcoming the difficulties plaguing previous
studies. We proceed to describe our data and method. In the results section, we present the
results of the direct test and compare them with the results of an indirect test. In the
discussion section, we provide some preliminary observations on why an indirect test could
lead to misleading results. We conclude by outlining the implications of our study for the
literature on job search and social networks.
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THEORY
While it seems intuitively plausible that job-seekers benefit from contacts, scholars
have found it extremely difficult to prove it analytically (for reviews, see Mouw 2003, 2006).
The first generation of studies typically examined the relationship between a job-seeker's
search method and her labor-market outcomes (for reviews, see Lin 2000; Marsden and
Gorman 2001; Mouw 2003). These studies suffered from the common methodological
problem of selection on the dependent variable (Montgomery 1992; Granovetter 1995;
Fernandez and Weinberg 1997). If we look at only the successful outcomes, we ignore how
many alternative offers a person receives, the means by which they were acquired, and how
they compare to the chosen job. This may lead to misleading conclusions because we may be
undercounting the bad offers that poor job-search channels yield.
While the second generation of studies has attempted to address this pitfall, Mouw's
recent critique suggests their results fail to establish causal nature of this association. To
avoid the selection on the dependent variable problem, the second generation of studies
focused on the job-seeker's social capital rather than on the tie used to find a job. These
studies found solid evidence that job-seekers with more social capital have better labor-
market outcomes than those with less social capital (de Graaf and Flap 1988; Lai et al. 1998;
V61ker and Flap 2001; Lin 2002). However, these studies suffer from another methodological
problem-omitted-variable bias. The relationship between social networks and labor-market
outcomes may be spurious; an omitted variable could influence both the quality of a job-
seeker's social capital and her labor-market outcomes.
To examine this possibility, Mouw (2003) proposes an indirect test: Ifjob-seekers do
benefit from using contacts, then those with more social capital should be more likely to find
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a job through contacts than otherwise identical job-seekers with less social capital. Drawing
on data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and the Urban Poverty and Family
Life Study, Mouw finds that job-seekers with more social capital are no more likely to use
their social networks to find a job than those with less social capital. Thus, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the association between a job-seeker's social capital and her labor-market
outcomes is spurious.
However, the indirect test could lead to misleading conclusions if it does not
accurately capture the heterogeneity of different job-seekers' social capital. Capturing
relevant social networks is inherently difficult (Bernard et al. 1984; Freeman and Romney
1987; Brewer 2000; Quintane and Kleinbaum 2011) and even more so for networks relevant
to job search, because weak ties matter more than strong ties for job-seekers (Granovetter
1973; Yakubovich 2005). Consider a newly minted Ph.D. seeking a job in a sociology
department. Presumably, her academic contacts-such as her dissertation advisor, former
classmates, coauthors, and people she has met at conferences-may be in the best position to
provide helpful information or influence. Were we to collect information only on her family,
childhood friends, or neighbors, we might fail to capture the networks that have the most
influence on labor outcomes.
To address the possible heterogeneity among job-seekers, we need to switch to a
within-individual test. Our version of the direct test draws on data from the full set of
applications that a job-seeker sends out during her job search, not just those that lead to
successful outcomes. Following Yakubovich (2005) and Obukhova's (2011) approach to
analyzing multiple-method job-search data, 2 our models use within-individual fixed-effects
2 This approach differs from the fixed-effects direct test in Mouw's work (e.g. 2002, 2003) in two important
ways. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Mouw compares how a given job-
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comparisons. This means that, instead of comparing the outcomes of two people's job
searches, we compare the outcomes from applications submitted by the same person through
different job-search methods. This approach rules out any potential individual-level omitted-
variable problems by controlling for all sources of between-individual heterogeneity, both
observed and unobserved, other than the differences in search method used in the analyses
(Mouw 2006). Thus, even if the available measures of social capital do not accurately capture
the ties most relevant to job search, the validity of the direct test's results is not affected.
Figure 1 presents a conceptual diagram of how we model an individual's job search.3
Each funnel represents a different method by which a job-seeker could learn about job
opportunities. The width of the leftmost cylinder in each funnel represents the number of
applications that a job-seeker initially submits. Each subsequent cylinder represents the
number of those original applications that lead to interviews, then to offers, and finally to a
job acceptance. To determine whether or not using contacts benefits a job-seeker, we
compare the effectiveness of using contacts with the effectiveness of using formal methods
when used by the same person. Through comparing the relative rates by which different job
applications move through this narrowing funnel, we can evaluate whether contacts are
indeed an effective method of job search.
<Jgurel HERE>
seeker found his most recent job at three different points in time (1994, 1996, and 1998). But for each point in
time, the NLSY does not provide information on both successful and unsuccessful job-search attempts.
Therefore, the results in Tables 2-4 (2003:878-881) suffer from the same selection-on-the-dependent-variable
problem that characterizes past job-search studies. Moreover, even with individual fixed effects, there could still
be intertemporal heterogeneity in job applications: Two job applications submitted by the same person but
several years apart will not be evaluated in the same light. The more recent application could demonstrate that
the candidate has several more years of additional working experience than indicated in the older application.
Our study design minimizes this concern by analyzing job-search histories at only one point in time: the
school-to-work transition.
3 Although not all employers recruit and screen potential employees in this standard manner, most large firms
use a variant of this model (Cohen and Pfeffer 1986) and it is a reasonable simplification of the general process.
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Contacts in school-to-work transition
The school-to-work transition offers a strategic research setting in which to conduct
our analyses. First, graduating university students search for jobs through a wide variety of
methods, making it possible to analyze the within-individual effectiveness of each method. In
our dataset, the majority of students submit applications through at least two search methods.
Second, the short time-span during which students search forjobs reduces concerns about the
accuracy with which they recall their job-search histories (Pierret 2001). This is especially
important since we collect information on all the job applications that a student submits, not
just the successful one.
Furthermore, our empirical context provides a conservative test for the usefulness of
social networks in job search because, for graduating students, social networks may not be
the most effective method. First, their networks are less likely to have useful resources. In
contrast to older job-seekers whose same-age peers have accumulated considerable job
experience and wide-ranging networks, these graduating students' peers are themselves
either graduating students or recent entrants to the job market and are less likely to be in a
position to pass on important information about job opportunities or to influence hiring
managers' decisions. As a result, we know that first-time job-seekers are less likely to rely on
and benefit from their social networks (McDonald and Elder 2006; McDonald 2011).
More importantly, graduating students have a much more viable alternative to
searching through contacts-university intermediaries (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989;
Rosenbaum 2001). University career offices often accumulate both extensive information
about employment opportunities and intensive information about specific employers' hiring
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practices and tendencies.4 The information that career offices transact may be particularly
valuable due to its limited distribution. For example, Ho's (2009) ethnography of the
recruiting process of New York City financial firms describes how some job openings are
made available only through the career offices of select universities. Career offices also
often maintain lists of alumni who work for particular employers and whom students can
contact. In sum, for job-seeking graduating students, university intermediaries are a highly
attractive alternative to personal contacts.
DATA AND METHOD
Sample
Our data was collected as part of the Future Paths project, a longitudinal study of
students at four major universities with engineering programs (hereafter referred to as
Research University, Private College, Engineering-Only College, and Public University).
The Future Paths project selected these universities for their geographic proximity to one
another and to reflect the diversity in engineering programs. Research University is a top-tier
engineering university with both undergraduate and graduate programs. Private College is a
small women-only liberal arts college with a relatively new engineering program.
Engineering-Only College offers only engineering undergraduate degrees. Public University
is a large state school with both undergraduate and graduate programs. The study selected its
original set of students using a stratified random sample of the undergraduates at each
school.5
4 See Small (2009) for a general discussion of the role of intermediaries as storage spaces for networks and
resources.
5 Non-engineering majors were included as a control group at each school except Engineering-Only College.
The control group was selected prior to the students' freshmen years so that the number of engineers and non-
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Beginning in their first year of college, participating students received online surveys
every year. The fifth year of surveys specifically contained the job-search questions that we
use for our analyses. Of the 487 students that took part in the fifth year of this survey, 291
provided information about their job-search histories. Table 1 presents basic means and
standard deviations for the descriptive characteristics of these students, both as a whole and
disaggregated across the four schools.6 Of all the student job-seekers, 67% were female,7
72% were White, and 22% were Asian. Although 45% of the students who responded to the
fifth-year survey came from Research University and only 11% from Engineering-Only
College, these percentages match the baselines of the initial sample: 41% Research
University, 33% Private College, 8% Engineering-Only College, and 19% Public University.
<Table I HERE>
Variables
The questionnaire asked each student how many applications she sent to job
opportunities found through each of 13 job-search methods: advertisements, career office,
college alumni network, school friends, non-school friends, family members, internship,
campus recruiter, direct contact with company, employment agency, head-hunter, faculty and
other. We constructed independent variables by grouping the 13 job-search methods into five
categories: advertisements (reference category for our analysis), university intermediaries
engineers were proportional at the beginning of the longitudinal study. However, over the course of the study,
many students switched majors, which partly explain why only 39% of the final sample was engineers (see
Table 1).
6 We also analyzed the descriptive statistics of the entire set of students in the original sample, including those
who did not search for jobs, and did not find any statistically significant differences in the demographic
composition of these two sets of students.
7 Our dataset's unusually high percentage of female students is not surprising given that one of the universities
was a women-only college.
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(career office and college alumni network8 ), contacts (school friends, non-school friends,
family members), internships, and all other methods (campus recruiter, direct contact with
company, employment agency, head-hunter, and faculty and other).
The questionnaire also asked how many interview opportunities and job offers each
student received via each method and which of these opportunities the student accepted.
Using this information, we construct three dependent variables: receiving an interview,
receiving an offer, and getting ajob. Receiving an interview is coded 1 if an application led
to an interview opportunity. Receiving an offer is coded 1 if an application led to a job offer.
Getting ajob is coded 1 if an application led to a job offer that the job-seeker accepted.9 The
first two outcomes allow us to examine the effects of using social networks at different stages
of the job-search and hiring process, while the last outcome is most similar to the dependent
variable of previous job-search studies.
Model
To test the relative effectiveness of different job-search methods, we run individual
fixed-effects linear probability models to analyze the likelihood that a job application
achieves one of the three aforementioned outcomes. To address the theoretical concern about
8 We chose to code the college alumni networks as a university intermediary method rather than as contacts
because we believe the underlying mechanisms that influence how college alumni networks help job-seekers are
more similar to those of the career office than to those of contacts (cf. Lee and Brinton (1996), who consider
alumni networks as a semi-institutional job-search method). A key difference between college alumni networks
and job-seekers' personal contacts is that the former method is, in principle, available to any student from the
same university. As further robustness checks, we have also rerun all our models with (a) alumni networks as a
separate covariate, (b) alumni networks included in the "all other methods" category, and (c) alumni networks
included in the "contacts" category; the results remained substantively identical to those reported here.
9 According to both our model and the structure of the questions on the survey, any application that leads to an
offer must also have led to an interview. Likewise, any application that leads to a job acceptance must also have
led to an interview and an offer.
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predicted values falling outside the [0, 1] range,' 0 we estimate a fixed-effects logit model.
Then, to address the possibility of correlations in the error terms of each individual's
application outcomes, we estimate fixed-effect linear probability models with clustered
standard errors and a fixed-effects logit models with clustered standard errors. Across these
different model specifications, there was no change in the direction of the results and little
change in the significance of the marginal effects. Thus, for ease of interpretation, we present
only the results from the linear probability models.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on job-search patterns using the student as the
unit of analysis. We find that, during their job search, students submitted, on average, 10.69
applications though all search methods combined (Column 6). Of all job-seeking students,
52% applied for jobs through advertisements, 46% through contacts, and 51% through
university intermediaries. About a quarter applied to employers with whom the student had
had an internship, and more than half applied through other methods. "
Though roughly the same percentage of students (but obviously not necessarily the
same students) used each of the job-search methods, the number of applications students sent
through those methods differed greatly. For example, students who applied through
advertisements on average submitted of 8.2 applications, while students who applied through
contacts and university intermediaries submitted an average of only 2.4 and 5.7 applications,
respectively. Students who applied with employers where they had had an internship
'm Some scholars (e.g., Aldrich and Nelson 1992) advise against using the linear probability model because it
can theoretically yield predicted probabilities greater than I or less than 0. This does not occur in our models.
Specifically, 19% applied through a campus recruiter, 13% through direct contact with an employer, 9%
through a job placement agency, 6% through a headhunter, and 9% through other miscellaneous means.
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submitted an average of only 1.3 applications. Among students who applied through all other
methods, the average was 3.8 applications.
<Table 2 HERE>
Disaggregating the statistics across different stages of the hiring process suggests that
the students who search through advertisements, contacts, and university intermediaries
appear to have roughly similar probabilities of having a positive labor-market outcome; that
is, 4 out of 10 received an interview, 3 out of 10 received an offer, and 2 out of 10 accepted a
job. Students searching through other methods appear to have the highest probability of
positive labor-market outcomes; almost everyone received an interview, three-quarters
received an offer, and 3 out of 10 got a job. This is not surprising; students are unlikely to use
these less-orthodox methods unless they expect them to be particularly effective for them.
Having had an internship with an employer appears to be the second-most effective job-
search method. This is also not surprising, since the job-seeker and the employer face
considerably less uncertainty in entering a work relationship.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics with the application as the unit of analysis. The
291 students in our dataset sent out 3,112 job applications (Column la), of which 1,424
resulted in interviews (Column 2a) and 715 led to job offers (Column 3a). In addition, the
results presented in Table 3 indicate that the relative percentages of applications originating
from different search methods do not vary much between the full and within-individual
samples, mitigating concerns that the within-individual sample we use for our robustness
checks is selectively biased. Specifically, for each outcome, 80% to 90% of applications in
the full sample are included in the within-individual samples. For example, while the original
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sample consists of 291 job-seekers who submitted 3,112 applications, the within-individual
sample consists of 204 job-seekers who submitted 2,785 applications.
<Table 3 HERE>
Direct test results
Table 4 presents the estimates from the linear probability models. We find that using
contacts leads to better labor-market outcomes than using advertisements. Specifically,
applications submitted through contacts were 16.6% more likely than applications submitted
through advertisements to lead to an interview, 14% more likely to lead to an offer, and
13.5% more likely to lead to a job. Moreover, we find that contacts outperform university
intermediaries, especially in later stages of job search. Specifically, univariate F-tests show
that applications submitted through contacts are more likely than applications submitted
through university intermediaries to lead to both an offer and a job, and these differences are
statistically reliable at the 0.05 and 0.0001 levels respectively [F-test = 5.60 and 29.50, df=
2817].
<Table 4 HERE>
Consistent with our expectation that university intermediaries are a viable job-search
method for student job-seekers, we find that applications submitted through a university
intermediary were 18% more likely than applications submitted through advertisements to
result in an interview (Model 1) and 5.9% more likely to result in an offer (Model 2). Yet,
they were no more likely to lead to a job. These results suggest that university intermediaries
are better at getting the student job-seeker in the door with the employer than at influencing
the employer's hiring decision.
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We also find that applications to jobs with employers for which a student job-seeker
had interned were 39.1% more likely than applications submitted through advertisements to
lead to an interview, 45% more likely to lead to an offer, and 18% more likely to lead to a
job-much higher rates of success. However, some of the advantages of other methods
disappear in the later stages of the job-search process. Specifically, applications submitted
through other methods are 21.9% more likely than applications submitted through
advertisements to lead to an interview and 13.4% more likely to lead to an offer, but only 9%
more likely to lead to a job.
Comparing direct and indirect tests
To compare the results of a direct and an indirect test, we turn to one subset of job-
seekers' contacts for which we have social network data-their school friends. In the third
wave of the longitudinal study, the survey asked, "How many students did you interact with
socially over the past two weeks?" and "How many students did you interact with in
completing school assignments during the past two weeks?" We use this information to
construct two logged count variables for school-related social capital, # socialfriends (In)
and # academicfriends (In), respectively.' 2 For these analyses, we also disaggregate
applications submitted through contacts into those submitted through school friends and
those submitted through all other contacts.
Our results suggest that an indirect test can produce null results even when a direct
test indicates that job-seekers benefit from contacts. We find that applications through school
12 We also run these models using only logged social ties or only logged academic ties as the covariate. We find
that these measures by themselves are not significantly associated with an individual's decision to search for a
job through all contacts or through school friends. This is not surprising, considering that the correlation
between logged social ties and logged academic ties-our two measures of social capital--is only 0.2894.
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friends are 19.5%, 12%, and 12.3% more likely than applications through advertisements to
lead to an interview, an offer, and a job, respectively; these results are significant at the 0.01
level (see Table 5). But the results of the indirect test lead to opposite conclusions. We find
that students with more school-related social capital are no more likely to use those ties than
students with less school-related social capital. The results presented in Table 6 show that
neither of these measures of school social capital is significantly associated with a person's
decision to search for a job either using all contacts or using schools friends. Thus, in contrast
to the results of the indirect test, the results from an indirect test suggest that job-seekers do
not benefit from using school friends.
<Table 5 HERE>
DISCUSSION
Consistent with results of single-firm studies, our results show that applications
submitted through contacts are more likely to lead to successful outcomes than applications
submitted through formal methods. These results hold not only for the final outcome of
getting a job but also for two intermediate outcomes within the hiring process-getting an
interview and getting a job offer. We also find evidence that applications submitted through
contacts are more likely than applications submitted through formal intermediaries to be
successful in getting a job offer and getting a job. Moreover, our results show that an indirect
test can produce null results even when a direct test indicates that job-seekers do benefit from
using contacts. In this section, we argue that these results suggest that, when possible,
researchers should use a direct test rather than an indirect test. We begin by presenting
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evidence against the possibility that the direct test results simply reflect self-selection into
method choice. Then we explain why an indirect test might yield misleading conclusions.
One possible explanation for the strength of our direct test's results is that job-seekers
self-select into the methods they use to search for jobs. Ifjob-seekers have a priori beliefs
about how effective certain search methods are for them personally, then a job-seeker with
poor social networks may well choose not to search through his contacts at all (Mouw 2003).
If this were true and taken to the logical extreme, then the observations of job-seekers who
use contacts to search for a job are, in fact, only observations of job-seekers who believe they
have good contacts. We test for potential selection effects using individual-level variables
from our study, including gender, non-White race, adjusted GPA, a square of adjusted GPA,
logged family income, and school social capital. For all job-search methods, we find that
none of the observed variables included in our study predicted the job-search methods an
individual job-seeker adopted.
<Table 6 HERE>
If the results of the direct test are not simply due to the self-selection of job seekers
into methods, then why does the indirect test produce null results when the direct test results
show that job-seekers do benefit from using contacts? One potential explanation is that the
effectiveness of the indirect test depends on the quality of the social-network measures. For
our specific survey, the measures of social capital may better capture some aspect of a
student's personality, such as gregariousness, than the usefulness of her contacts. Because
our social-network measures may not accurately assess job-seekers' social capital, it is not
surprising that an indirect test leads to null results. Yet, while our example might appear
particularly flawed, it points to a larger problem with the indirect test: The test's accuracy
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depends on the researcher's ability to capture between-individual heterogeneity in contacts
that might be in a position to influence the outcome of the job-seeker's job search.
Because capturing individual's social networks is inherently difficult (Bernard et al.
1984; Freeman and Romney 1987; Brewer 2000; Quintane and Kleinbaum 2011), this is an
important limitation of the indirect test. Due to the practical constraints of surveying a large
sample, respondents in network surveys are most likely to be asked about a limited number
of contacts and are therefore more likely to name their strong ties (Brewer and Webster 2000;
Quintane and Kleinbaum 2011). But if weak ties matter more for job search and are not well
captured by measures of social capital in surveys of job-seekers, then using an indirect test to
make inferences about network causality may lead to misleading results. Specifically, job-
seekers whose weak ties did help them in their job search would be undercounted in the
sample and the coefficient associated with the effectiveness of social capital would be
downwardly biased.
Another important piece of evidence for the influence of the quality of social-capital
measures comes from our finding that the likelihood that applications submitted through
school contacts lead to better outcomes than applications submitted through other search
methods is not significantly related to students' school-related social capital. Specifically, we
estimated models that include an interaction terms for the schoolfriends search-method
dummy and (a) # socialfriends (in) and (b) # academicfriends (In). By including this term,
we test whether students with more social or academic friends get more benefit from using
school friends in their job search than students with fewer social or academic friends do. We
find that students with more social or academic friends did not get more benefit from using
school friends in their job search than students with fewer social or academic friends did.
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These results would be puzzling unless we assume that these two measures of social capital
do not adequately capture the social capital that is relevant for using school friends to seek a
job.
<Table 7 HERE>
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
While it is intuitively plausible that using contacts in job search improves labor-
market outcomes, there is still both theoretical disagreement and inconclusive empirical
evidence concerning why a job-seeker's social capital is associated with her labor-market
outcomes. In particular, recent research suggests that the association might be spurious--due
to an omitted variable that influences both the quality of a job-seeker's social capital and her
labor-market outcomes (Mouw 2003; for a more general statement of this problem, see
Manski 1993). Mouw's results are particularly puzzling when we consider the strong
evidence from single-firm studies in favor of a non-spurious explanation (Fernandez and
Weinberg 1997; Petersen et al. 2000; Fernandez et al. 2000; Fernandez and Sosa 2005;
Yakubovich and Lup 2006). We argue that solving this puzzle requires a direct within-
individual test of each method's effectiveness. Using data on school-to-work transition
among university students, we show that job-seekers do benefit from searching for jobs
through contacts. We also argue that a direct test is superior to an indirect test because its
effectiveness does not depend on the quality of the social-network measures.
Our study makes an important contribution to the social-network causality debate. As
sociologists, we find the idea that job-seekers benefit from contacts intuitively appealing.
However, despite its intuitive appeal, the empirical foundations for these claims are shaky
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(Mouw 2003, see also Manski 1993). Our study joins a growing number of studies that
attempt to put the literature on a firmer methodological ground (for a review, see Mouw
2006). Some of this literature exploits unique contexts in which individuals are assigned
social networks (Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006; Reagans and McEvily 2003), thus avoiding
the possibility that an omitted variable accounts for an association between a job-seeker's
social capital and her labor-market outcomes. Our study takes an alternative path by directly
revealing how those job-seekers who use social networks benefit from using them.
By highlighting the theoretical importance of investigating different job-search
methods with more accurate measures of social capital than were available for this study, our
results suggest a fruitful direction for future investigation. Because of the constraints of our
data on job-seekers' social capital, our study's conclusions are limited in two ways. We were
able to provide only preliminary evidence for the lack of self-selection into job-search
methods, and we found no evidence that job-seekers with social capital get more benefit from
using contacts than they get from other methods. Future studies with more accurate measures
of social capital can extend our research by exploring how and why the quality of social
capital relates to the benefits it delivers to a job-seeker. Thus, while we can see now that job-
seekers do benefit from contacts, only with more accurate measures of social capital can see
why.
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Figure 1: Illustrative Funnel-Diagram of a Single Job-seeker's Applications and Their Progress through Stages of the Hiring Process
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of students who searched for a job
Research Private Engineering- Public All schools
University College Only College University
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Major
Humanities 3% 40% 0% 7% 14%
Social sciences 4% 26% 0% 12% 12%
Engineering 51% 6% 100% 24% 39%
Math/Physical sciences 28% 19% 0% 33% 25%
Business 14% 9% 0% 24% 13%
Gender
Female 53% 100% 35% 33% 67%
Race
White 48% 84% 74% 83% 72%
Asian 35% 8% 22% 2% 22%
Other 16% 8% 4% 15% 6%
Number of students 131 90 23 47 291
Note: The percentages of majors for a school might add up to more than 100% because 18 students had double
majors and one student had a triple major
Pg. 23 of 32
Table 2. Distribution of students and their labor-market outcomes by job-search method
Job-search method Advertise- Contacts University Intern- All other Any
ments intermed. ships methods method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Students who applied through method
# of students 151 106 147 76 158 291
As % of all students 52% 46% 51% 26% 54% 100%
Mean number of resumes 8.20 2.42 5.71 1.34 3.83 10.69
submitted
Students who received interviews through method
# of students 121 93 125 67 146 288
As % of all students 42% 32% 43% 23% 51% 99%
iteriews receved 2.83 1.43 4.00 1.27 2.34 4.94
Students who received offers through method
# of students 91 69 92 57 116 274
As % of all students 31% 24% 32% 20% 40% 94%
Mean number of offers 1.74 1.29 2.19 1.26 1.56 2.61received
Students who found a job through method
# of students 55 46 52 26 81 260
As % of all students 19% 16% 18% 9% 28% 89%
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Table 3. Distribution of job-search attempts, interviews, and offers by search method
Job searches
Original w/in-indiv
samplea sampleb
(1a) (Ib)
Interviews
Original
samplea
(2a)
received
w/in-indiv
sampleb
(2b)
Offers received
Original w/in-indiv
samplea sampleb
(3a) (3b)
Jobs Found
Original w/in-indiv
samplea sampleb
(4a) (4b)
Total applications 3112 2785 1424
1143 715 590 260 170
Applications by method
Advertisements
Contacts
University
intermediaries
Internships
All other methods
1238
40%
257
8%
840
27%
102
3%
675
22%
1165
42%
224
8%
753
27%
79
3%
564
20%
342
24%
123
9%
500
35%
85
6%
374
26%
285
25%
81
7%
440
38%
57
5%
280
24%
158
22%
85
12%
202
28%
72
10%
198
28%
125
21%
63
11%
178
30%
58
10%
166
28%
55
21%
46
18%
52
20%
26
10%
83
32%
34
19%
27
15%
37
21%
18
10%
83
47%
# of students 291 204 288 178 274 170 260 170
Notes: Percentages are of number of applications from that method relative to total applications at that stage; i.e., in Column 2a, university intermediaries
make up 35% (i.e., 500/1424) of the total job applications that received an interview.
aThe number of observation in Column la includes all search attempts for all students. The samples in Columns 2a, 3a, and 4a include all interviews that
all students received, all offers that all students received, and jobs found, respectively. These are the total numbers of applications that we use for our
various linear probability models.
b The number of observation in Column lb includes all search attempts for students that (a) received more than one interview (from any search method)
and (b) received fewer interviews than the total number of applications sent out. Likewise, the number of observations in Columns 2b, 3b, and 4b is the
number of search attempts at the interview, offer, and jobs found levels, respectively. These are the total numbers of applications that are used in
conditional logit models.
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Table 4. Linear probability models of the likelihood of progressing to the next
stage of the hiring process
Receiving an
interview
Receiving an
offer Getting a job
Search method
Contacts
University
intermediaries
Internships
All other methods
Constant
Observations
R-squared
(1) (2) (3)
0.166**
(4.80)
0.183**
(6.26)
0.391 **
(7.67)
0.219**
(7.81)
0.334**
(21.50)
3112
0.0952
0.140**
(4.85)
0.059*
(2.40)
0.452**
(10.60)
0.134**
(5.69)
0.159**
(12.18)
3112
0.0735
0.135**
(6.38)
0.008
(0.48)
0.180**
(5.77)
0.09**
(5.38)
0.044**
(4.57)
3112
0.0345
Number of students 291 291 291
Notes: Coefficients are the difference in the probability of an outcome for each method;
dropped search method is advertisements; t-values in parentheses; two-tailed tests: **
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<O.I
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Table 5. Linear probability models of the likelihood of progressing to the next
stage of the hiring process, separated by types of contacts
Search method
School friends
All other contacts
University
Intermediaries
Internships
All other methods
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Receiving an
interview
(1)
0.195**
(3.72)
0.148**
(3.52)
0.183**
(6.27)
0.391 **
(7.69)
0.219**
(7.81)
0.334**
(21.49)
3112
0.0948
Receiving an
offer
(2)
0.120**
(2.73)
0.152**
(4.34)
0.058*
(2.39)
0.451 **
(10.59)
0.133**
(5.69)
0.159**
(12.19)
3112
0.0739
Getting a job
(3)
0.123**
(3.85)
0.141**
(5.50)
0.008
(0.47)
0.179**
(5.76)
0.09**
(5.38)
0.044**
(4.58)
3112
0.0341
Number of students 291 291 291
Notes: Coefficients are the difference in the probability of an outcome for each
method; dropped search method is advertisements; t-values in parentheses; two-
tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<O.l
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Table 6: Marginal effects of probit regressions on decisions to search for a job
Means
(St. dev)
All All University All School
methods methods intermed. contacts friends
Indep. variables
Female"
Non-White a
Adjusted GPA
Adjusted GPA 2
Logged family
income
Logged social ties
Logged academic
ties
Observations
LR chi2
Log likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.697 0.031 0.035 0.042 -0.107 -0.066 0.099
(0.027) (0.633) (0.597) (0.552) (0.142) (0.216) (0.175)
0.327 -0.023 -0.033 0.183 -0.017 -0.005 -0.104
(0.029) (0.700) (0.591) (0.009) (0.789) (0.897) (0.134)
4.301 1.669
(0.025) (0.018)
1.775 4.203 0.313 1.967 1.331
(0.013) (0.003) (0.677) (0.023) (0.125)
18.679 -0.220 -0.233 -0.513 -0.054 -0.236 -0.190
(0.206) (0.011) (0.008) (0.002) (0.557) (0.021) (0.076)
11.255 0.018 0.017 0.034 0.062 0.023 0.033
(0.047) (0.583) (0.611) (0.376) (0.077) (0.330) (0.399)
3.352
(0.032)
2.506
(0.013)
-0.045 -0.078 -0.084 0.003 0.008
(0.394) (0.184) (0.124) (0.935) (0.896)
0.080 0.292 -0.021 -0.071
(0.512) (0.024) (0.867) (0.426)
284 284
14.86
284 284
15.81 33.58
284
25.30
284
10.40
0.079
(0.568)
284
45.59
-156.52 -156.045 -164.892 -152.314 -97.788 -164.833
Notes: All models include university fixed effects; z-values in parentheses unless noted; all marginal effects are
calculated for white males with average values of adjusted GPA, adjusted GPA2 , logged family income, logged
social ties, and logged academic ties
" dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Advertise-
ments
Table 7. Linear probability models of the likelihood of progressing to the next stage of the hiring process,
including social-capital interaction effects with school friends
Receiving an
interview
Search method (1)
School friends
Logged social ties * School friends
Logged academic ties * School friends
All other contacts
University intermediaries
Internships
All other methods
Constant
Observations
R-squared
0.170
(1.51)
0.018
(0.41)
-0.021
(-0.30)
0.148**
(3.52)
0.183**
(6.27)
0.392**
(7.69)
0.219**
(7.81)
0.334**
(21.46)
3112
0.0953
Receiving an offer
(2)
0.177k
(1.88)
-0.011
(-0.28)
-0.035
(-0.59)
0.153**
(4.35)
0.059*
(2.41)
0.451**
(10.58)
0.134
(5.71)
0.159**
(12.18)
3112
0.0731
Number of students 291 291 291
Notes: Coefficients are the difference in the probability of an outcome for each method; dropped search method
is advertisements; t-values in parentheses; two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<O.1
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Getting a job
(3)
0.237**
(3.43)
-0.036
(-1.32)
-0.029
(-0.68)
0.142**
(5.53)
0.008
(0.49)
0.179**
(5.74)
0.092**
(5.41)
0.044**
(4.58)
3112
0.0344
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